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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
STERLING H. NELSON & 
SONS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, d/b/a 
MURRAY ELEVATORS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14,343 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Respondent accepts as sufficient the STATEMENT OF 
THE KIND OF CASE and the RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL set forth 
in appellantfs brief but wishes to clarify the explanation 
of the DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT with the following state-
ment: 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge Croft granted respondent's motion for sum-
mary judgment with respect to -befch- its complaint, entering 
judgment for the additional freight charges, and against 
appellant on its counterclaim based upon an alleged negligent 
quotation of freight rates. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Contrary to the representation of appellant in the 
first line of page 2 of its brief, Judge Croft's decision 
was not grounded upon "ICC case law" (none was cited to the 
Judge either orally or in briefs of counsel) but rather upon 
decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court which hold specifically 
that misquotation of freight rates by an interstate carrier 
will not estop such carrier from collecting the full and 
correct amount of the transportation charges due nor can 
such misquotation serve as the basis of a cause of action 
against the misquoting carrier for alleged damage that may 
have resulted from such misquotation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not accept appellant's STATEMENT OF 
FACTS as being either relevant to the issues of the case or 
of sufficient detail to provide the court with a full and 
complete explanation of the lawsuit and therefore submits 
its own STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
A. HISTORY OF LITIGATION 
In its initial answer to respondent's complaint, 
appellant, in addition to denying liability for the freight 
charges, alleged a counterclaim (R.158) claiming damages as 
a result of respondent's alleged assessment of excessive 
freight charges in violation of its tariff provisions. After 
a considerable amount of discovery by both parties, appellant 
withdrew this counterclaim (R.69) and filed an amended counter-
-2-
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claim (R.62) alleging that any failure on its part to pay 
the correct amount of freight charges was the sole result 
of a negligent quotation of freight rates by respondent 
and that, should appellant be required to pay such addi-
tional freight charges, it should be able to recover against 
respondent damages in an equal amount. 
In response to respondent's initial motion for sum-
mary judgment, filed July 22, 1975 (R.47), together with sup-
porting affidavit (R.55) and memorandum of law (R.48), appel-
lant filed an "Amended Answer and Counterclaim" (R.35) 
alleging an additional "Seventh Defense" claiming that should 
respondent be successful in defending against appellant's 
counterclaim for negligent quotation of freight rates, such a 
result would amount to a denial of a remedy against respondent 
and would constitute a taking of appellant's property without 
just compensation in violation of appellant's constitutional 
rights. The court denied respondent's initial motion because 
of a question of fact raised in an affidavit (R.42) appellant 
served on respondent at 5:05 p.m. the afternoon before the 
hearing (R.14) . 
Respondent filed the subject motion for summary judg-
ment on October 1, 1975 (R.13), together with an additional 
supporting affidavit (R.29) and supplemental memorandum of 
law (R.14); and on October 16, 1975, Judge Croft signed the 
order (R.8) granting said motion from which appellant has 
taken this appeal. 
-3-
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B. FACTS OF CASE, 
All the material facts of this case have been 
either expressly admitted by appellant in its answers to 
interrogatories and answers to requests for admission or 
appear, unrefuted, in affidavits of an employee of respondent. 
They may be succinctly stated as follows (the paragraphs are 
numbered for reference purposes): 
1. The appellant made the shipments in question. 
R. 119-126 (Requests for Admission Nos. 1, 6, 11, 16, 21, 26, 
31, and 36) and R.110 (answer No. 1 to said Requests). 
2. The appellant paid freight charges for these 
shipments totalling $13,016.76. R.119-126 (Requests for Admis-
sion Nos. 2, 7, 12, 17, 22, 27, 32, and 37) and R.110 (answer 
No. 1 to said Requests). 
3. The correct tariff items for calculating the 
correct freight rates for each of the eight shipments are 
those items set forth in respondent's first Requests for Admis-
sion, Nos. 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, and 40. R.119-126. 
Appellant made this admission in its answers to respondent's 
second Requests for Admission, Nos. 9-16, dated September 13, 
1974. R.66, 67. 
4. Each of these tariff items were at all material 
times on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
and were published and filed in accordance with ICC require-
ments. R.67 (Appellant's admission to Request No. 17). 
-4-
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5. Applying these tariff items to the shipments in 
question results in total freight charges for all eight ship-
ments of $14,873.61, or $1,856.85 more than appellant has 
heretofore paid to the respondent. R.55-58 and R.29-32 
(Affidavits of Mr. R. D. Barker). 
In commenting on the STATEMENT OF FACTS made by 
the appellant, respondent accepts as generally correct the 
information set forth in paragraphs 1-8. In regard to para-
graph No. 9, however, respondent takes issue with the state-
ments therein and on page 12 of its brief to the effect that 
respondent does not know what the correct rates for the ship-
ments in question are. Respondent's answer to interrogatories 
quoted on said page 12 is taken out of context and misrepre-
sents to the court the meaning of the answer which, when read 
in full in response to the interrogatories, obviously refers 
to shipments not the subject of this litigation. Appellant 
knows full well respondent is claiming as correct those tariff 
items and rates set forth in respondent's Requests for Admis-
sion (R.119-126) filed at the outset of this litigation (July 
2, 1973) and in Mr. Barker's affidavits of July 21, 1975, and 
August 27, 1975 (R.55 and R.29). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: JUDGE CROFT CORRECTLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT WITH RESPECT TO THE PRAYER OF 
ITS COMPLAINT. 
-5-
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POINT 2: JUDGE CROFT CORRECTLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DENYING APPELLANT RECOVERY UNDER ITS COUNTERCLAIM. 
POINT 3: AFFIRMANCE OF JUDGE CROFT'S DECISION WILL NOT 
INFRINGE ON APPELLANTfS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
POINT 1: 
It is axiomatic that a misquotation of freight rates 
by an interstate carrier is no excuse for an aggrieved shipper 
to pay less than the full and correct amount of transportation 
charges legally due. A misquotation of rates, the result of 
either inadvertence or intentional conduct by the parties, 
is no defense. Probably the most frequently cited decision 
to this effect is the case of Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. 
Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94 (1915), wherein Mr. Justice Hughes made 
the following oft-quoted statements at pp. 97-98: 
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the 
rate of the carrier duly filed is the 
only lawful charge. Deviation from it 
is not permitted upon any pretext. 
Shippers and travelers are charged with 
notice of it, and they as well as the 
carrier must abide by it, unless it is 
found by the Commission to be unreason-
able. Ignorance or misquotation of 
rates is not an excuse for paying or 
charging either less or more than the 
rate filed. This rule is undeniably 
strict and it obviously may work hard-
ship in some cases, but it embodies 
the policy which has been adopted by 
Congress in the regulation of inter-
state commerce in order to prevent 
unjust discrimination. 
-6-
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'Neither the intentional nor acci-
dental misstatement of the applicable 
published rate will bind the carrier 
or shipper. The lawful rate is that 
which the carrier must exact and that 
which the shipper must pay. The ship-
per's knowledge of the lawful rate is 
conclusively presumed, and the carrier 
may not be required to surrender the 
goods carried upon the payment of the 
rate paid, if that was less than the 
lawful rate, until the full legal rate 
has been paid.1—It was 'the purpose 
of the Act to have but one rate, open 
to all alike and from which there could 
be no departure.' [Emphasis added.] 
The rule of the Maxwell case has not been overturned 
but, rather, has been affirmed in a long line of state and 
federal court cases including cases from the U. S. Supreme 
Court. There is no dissent from its holding. The following 
is just a sampling of cases which have cited and follow this 
decision, indicating its wide and unquestioned acceptance as 
the law of the land on the issues at stake here. Others may 
be found in the annotation at 88 A.L.R. 2d 1375: 
Texas & Pac. Ry., et al., v. Leatherwood, 250 U.S. 
478 (1919); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., et al., 260 U.S. 
156 (1922); Dayton Coal & Iron Co., Ltd., v. Cincinnati, New 
Orleans & Texas Pac. Ry., 239 U.S. 446 (1915); Gilbert Imported 
Hardwoods, Inc., et al., v. 245 Packages of Guatambu Squares, 
More or Less, et al., 508 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1975); Nyad 
Motor Freight, Inc., v. W. T. Grant Co., 486 F.2d 1112 (2d 
Cir. 1973) ; Allegheny Corp. v. Romeo, Inc., 392 F.Supp. 38 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(W.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Sea Train Lines, Inc./ 
370 F.Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Pan Am. 
Mail Line, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe R.R, v. John Sexton & Co., 3 39 F.Supp. 
1202 (D. Kan. 1972); So. Pac. v. Miller Abattoir Co., 454 
F.2d 357 (3rd Cir. 1972). 
Contrary to what appellant would have the court 
believe, the antidiscrimination provisions of the Interstate 
Commerce Act (I.C.A.) [40 U.S.C.A. § 6(7) and the Elkins Act 
Amendment, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-43], which serve as the basis 
of the Maxwell rule, were never intended by Congress and 
have never been interpreted by the courts to apply solely to 
intentional, collusive conduct. Union Pac. R.R. v. U.S., 
313 U.S. 450 (1941). Granted, the prevention of intentional 
discriminatory practices is one of the evils thought to be 
eradicated. But, in addition, it was also the intention of 
Congress to insure that every shipper, large or small, pay 
the same amount for the same transportation services. If 
a shipper is allowed to pay less than the going tariff rate, 
a preference is involved whether it results from inadvertence 
or collusive conduct. Maxwell says precisely this: "Neither 
the intentional nor accidental misstatement . . ." (p.98) 
[Emphasis added.] The reasoning for this rule is obvious. 
If a finding of "secret" rebates was the only criteria for 
finding discrimination under the I.C.A., the door would be 
-8-
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left wide open for shippers to allege misquotation, whether 
any misquotation was involved or not (or collude with the 
carrier to misquote under the guise of inadvertence) and 
rely thereon. The end result would be preferential rate 
making even though there might be no collusion on the part 
of the carrier. To avoid this possibility, the question of 
intent, logically, does not enter the picture. It is the 
end result that the courts look to. As stated in the case 
of Materials, Inc., et al., v. The DeFonce Constr.Corp., 332 
A.2d 788 (Conn. 1974), at p.789: 
Even though there is nothing in the 
evidence to suggest a sweetheart con-
tract, a coerced discount, or a sub 
rosa rebate, the court cannot extend 
this protection to the defendant 
because of certain fundamental concepts 
arising out of the statutory regulation 
of common carriers . . . The prevailing 
view . . . is that a common carrier 
has a right and a duty to recover the 
scheduled rates regardless of contract 
. . . This has long been the federal 
view . . . The general policy that 
rates filed with the regulatory commis-
sion must be observed pervades the 
regulations of [contract motor] carriers 
and is enforced by permitting any under-
charges to be recovered in order to 
preserve the integrity of filed tariffs. 
The courts will not permit deviations 
from filed rates to be validated by such 
doctrines as mistake, agreement, estoppel 
or unclean hands . . . This view also 
prevails in the several states where 
statutes regulate interstate carriers. 
[Emphasis added.] 
It is interesting to note that § 6(7) of the I.C.A. 
does not make any reference to "secret" rebates or "collusive" 
-9-
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practices. It simply states, in pertinent part, that: 
No carrier . . . shall . . . charge 
or demand or collect or receive a 
greater or less or different compen-
sation for • . . transportation of 
passengers or property, or for any 
service in connection therewith . . . 
than the rates, fares, and charges 
which are specified in the tariff 
filed and in effect at the time. 
Clearly, it is not benefits or burdens or collusive or negli-
gent conduct which dictates whether payment of the full tariff 
rate should be made but, rather, an overriding public policy 
enunciated by Congress that, to the extent possible there shall 
be a uniform, reasonable, and certain schedule of charges for 
interstate and foreign transportation services. Simply stated, 
the question is not how or why a deviation from published 
tariff occurred but whether, in fact, it did occur. Again, 
as stated in F. Burkhart Mfg. Co. v. Fort Worth & D.C. Ry., 
149 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1945), at p.190: 
Congress, in order to eliminate every 
form of discrimination, has provided 
that there shall be permitted neither 
an intentional nor unintentional devia-
tion from the predetermined schedule 
of rates. An intentional act in 
granting a shipper a preferential rate 
was made a crime. To permit departure 
from the regular rate provided only 
that it is the result of a misunder-
standing or mistake defeats the very 
purpose of the law. [Emphasis added.] 
It being established that the proscription reaches 
innocent misquotations as well as collusive conduct, appellant's 
-10-
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argument of an unwarranted and unconstitutional "conclusive 
presumption" of a "secret rebate" must fail. Further, 
appellant's narrow and limited interpretation of the appli-
cation of the I.C.A. is self-contradictory, as noted from 
its use of the following quotation (in part) from Professor 
Lake's book, on page 5 of its brief, which clearly acknowl-
edges the "sweeping" construction of the Act given by the 
courts: ' 
. . . The section [I.C.A. § 6(7)] is 
so sweeping as to forbid any departure 
from the published tariff, however 
harmless and however innocent in motive. 
It is under this section that the car-
rier can sue for undercharges made acci-
dentally and is absolved from contracts 
to give special services. The courts 
have been obligated by its terms to 
render judgments in favor of the carriers 
which were grossly unjust to the recip-
ient of such casual and harmless prefer-
ences. [Emphasis added.] 
POINT 2: JUDGE CROFT CORRECTLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DENYING APPELLANT RECOVERY UNDER ITS COUNTERCLAIM. 
It stands to reason that if a misquotation of freight 
rates by a carrier is not an excuse for paying the full 
tariff rate, such misquotation, be it negligence or inten-
tional conduct, cannot be the basis for a cause of action by 
the aggrieved shipper for damages allegedly resulting from 
the misquotation. Again, there is a plethora of cases hold-
ing to this effect, including cases from the U. S. Supreme 
Court; and again, there is no dissent. In Texas & Pac. Ry. 
-11-
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v. Mugg & Dryden, 202 U.S. 242 (1906), a shipper of coal 
was quoted an erroneous freight rate and, having sold the 
coal at a price based upon such erroneous rate, sued to 
recover damages when compelled to pay the proper rate which 
was higher. There, as here, the amount of damage was alleged 
to be the difference between the proper rate and the rate 
erroneously given with reference to which the sale had been 
made. Mr. Chief Justice White, following the case of Gulf, 
C.&S.F. R.R. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98 (1895), held specifically 
that the shipper could not recover. The case of 111. Cent. 
R. v. Henderson Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 441 (1912), affirmed 
the Mugg and Hefley decisions. 
Numerous federal circuit and district courts, 
following the U. S. Supreme Court decisions, have specifically 
held that a shipper has no right to recover damages for a 
carrier's misquotation of freight rates. T. &M. Transp. Co. 
v. S. W. Shattuck Chem. Co., 148 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1945) ; 
Silent Sioux Corp. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 262 F.2d 474 (8th 
Cir. 1959); Pettibone v. Richardson, 126 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 
1942); Atl. Coastline Ry. v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 
30 F.Supp. 7 26 (D.C. Va. 1939); Porto Transp. Inc. v. Consol. 
Diesel Elec. Corp., 19 F.R.D. 256 (D.C.N.Y. 1956). As 
explained in F. Burkhart Mfg. Co. v. Fort Worth & D.C. Ry., 
supra, at p.910: 
-12-
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The "counterclaim1 of the appellant is 
in reality an assertion that if the 
carrier is entitled to judgment . . . 
on its claim for undercharges, the 
appellant is entitled to a judgment in 
an equal amount against the carrier 
for damages caused by the latterfs 
fraud. The appellant, however, as one 
who was conclusively presumed and legally 
bound to know the tariff rate, cannot 
be heard to say that it was deceived or 
damaged by false representations about 
the rate. [Emphasis added.] 
The highest courts of appeal in several states have 
also ruled to the same effect. Graves Truckline, Inc., v. 
High Plains Dressed Beef, Inc., 462 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1969); 
Atl. Coastline Ry. v. Park, 127 S.E.2d 622 (So. Car. 1962); 
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v. Marty, 353 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 
1960). As stated in Time-DC, Inc., v. Tappins, Inc., 313 A.2d 
234 (N.J. 1973) , at p.236: 
In a case, not unlike this one, a 
carrier sought to recover undercharges 
from a shipper. Shipments had been 
made and paid for when the carrier 
discovered it had made erroneous 
charges. Although the shipper based 
its product costs on the quoted charges 
and suffered an economic hardship, the 
court allowed the carrier to recover 
with interest from the dates of ship-
ments because the tariff binds the 
carrier and shipper with the force of 
law and may not be waived. Since the 
tariff is mandatory, no act or omis-
sion of the carrier will estop it from 
enforcing its applicable provisions. 
Miller v. Ideal Cement Co., 214 F.Supp. 
717 (D.C. Wyo. 1963). 
Additional citations can be found at 88 A.L.R. 2d 1375 at p.1392. 
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POINT 3: AFFIRMANCE OF JUDGE CROFT'S DECISION WILL NOT 
INFRINGE ON APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 
Specifically, there is no constitutional issue at 
stake here. The following are reasons why: 
1. Whatever power there is over interstate and 
foreign commerce is clearly vested in Congress and individual 
rights of shippers and carriers as respects such commerce 
are subordinate to the strong and overriding authority of 
Congress to regulate in this area. Under such power and 
for the reasons expressed herein, Congress has prohibited 
every form of rebate in respect to transportation costs of 
interstate shipments regardless of the legal theory or device 
upon which such rebates are based. If the theory or device 
is an agreement to ship at a rate lower than what is allowed 
by the tariffs, whether such agreement is the result of inten-
tional collusion or inadvertence on the part of the parties to 
the agreement, Congress may declare such an agreement null 
and void and may declare unenforceable any rights of a party 
based thereon, without violating any constitutional rights 
of such party. Norman v. B&O R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1934), at 
pp.304-10 and particularly at p.308. 
As stated in the case of Davis v. Keystone Steel & 
Wire Co., 148 N.E. 47 (111. 1925), discussing Congress1 power 
to regulate commerce and prohibit rate discrimination, at p.51: 
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Such interference with the freedom of 
contract is not an unconstitutional 
interference with the liberty of a 
citizen to make contracts, or an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of his property 
without due process of law. Congress 
has the right to regulate commerce 
between the states. It is a proper 
exercise of this power in order to 
prevent unreasonable extortion and dis-
criminatory rates and discrimination 
in the rendition of service and in 
preference to persons or localities, 
to prescribe the terms on which the 
services of carriers, in connection 
with interstate transportation, may 
be rendered, the nature of those ser-
vices, the compensation for them, and 
the character of the contract between 
the carrier and the shipper. . . . 
[Emphasis added.] 
2. Defendant's counterclaim is based upon a common 
law negligence theory which Congress clearly has the power to 
modify without infringing on constitutional rights guaranteed 
by the Fifth Amendment. As stated in the case of Denver & Rio 
Grande W. R.R. v. Marty, supra, at pp.1097-98, where precisely 
the same issues were before the Colorado Supreme Court as are 
present in this case (with respect to an intrastate shipment): 
Defendant's counsel ably argues that 
even though the statute and the cases 
render a contract contrary to the 
policy of the statute unenforceable, 
it should not prevent the assertion 
of a claim based wholly upon tort; 
that to give effect to the statute to 
prevent such a claim deprives the 
claimant of important common law 
rights. However, as we read the 
statute, it prohibits rebates regard-
less of the legal theory upon which 
they are based. To hold that the 
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statute affects contract claims only 
and is not applicable to demands 
growing out of the rate misquotation 
which arise on the tort theory would 
effectually nullify this statute and 
the policy set forth therein. Thus, 
the strong policy of the statute 
would become meaningless if it could 
be circumvented by merely developing 
a different legal theory . . . 
. . . The further argument of 
the defendants is that the refusal to 
recognize a right of action based 
"' ' upon tort deprives them of a claim 
in negligent misrepresentation con-
trary to the demands of the constitu-
tion of Colorado and of the United 
States. The contention that the 
general assembly cannot modify common 
law rights was considered and rejected 
in Vogts v. Guerrette, . . . 351 P.2d 
851. [Emphasis added.] 
The Vogts case (Colo. 1960) based its decision 
(that the legislature may modify common law rights of action) 
upon U. S. Supreme Court cases which have clearly established 
the principle that the constitution does not forbid the crea-
tion of new rights, or the abolition of old ones, recognized 
by the common law, to obtain a permissible legislative objec-
tive. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929); New York Cent. 
R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916); Munn v. 111., 94 U.S. 
113 (1876). Who will deny that prevention of discrimination 
in interstate commerce is a "permissible legislative objec-
tive"? 
3. Denial of appellant's right to recover on its 
counterclaim is not a "taking" in the Fifth Amendment sense 
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since any damages resulting are consequential only. The 
cases are clear than an indirect injury to property resulting 
from legitimate governmental actions intended to benefit the 
general public is not protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1870), at pp.551-52; B 
Amusement Co. v. U. S., 180 F.Supp. 386 (Ct. CI. 1960); 
Laycock v. Kenney, 270 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1959), at p.592. 
Again, it cannot be argued that the purposes underlying the 
I.C.A. and court decisions interpreting and applying the 
same are legitimate and intended to benefit the public as 
a whole. 
4. The appellant has no "right" to recover damages 
which can be "taken" since no cause of action for misquota-
tion of rates exists. The right to maintain an action 
depends upon the existence of a cause of action which involves 
a combination of a right on the part of one party and a viola-
tion of such right by another party. There can be no wrong 
without a corresponding right and no breach of a duty by 
one person without a corresponding right belonging to some 
other person. 
In this case the appellant has no legal right to 
expect and rely on plaintiff to provide it with information 
regarding transportation rates and charges for the shipments 
in question, since defendant itself is conclusively presumed 
to know the contents of all published tariffs. As stated in 
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Atl. Coastline R.R, v. Park, supra, quoting, in part at p. 62 4, 
from Pettibone v. Richardson, supra: 
It is clear that the defendant, having 
sold the livestock on a cost plus basis, 
has suffered a loss, but the decisions 
are definite to the effect that under 
the present state of facts the railroad 
is not liable for this loss . . . 
• • • The defendant is conclusively 
presumed to know the proper rates . . . 
Therefore, the defendant had no right 
to rely on the railroad1s quotation of 
raxies » . . . 
The attempt by resourceful counsel 
to circumvent these decisions by charging 
that the railroad company was negligent 
in failing to correct its error in quoting 
rates must fail. The misquotation and 
claimant1s reliance upon it are the essence 
of the counterclaim. Absent the right of 
reliance, the cause of action fails, 
whether based on the misquotation or the 
delay in correcting it. See also the case 
of F. Burkhart Mfg. Co. v. Fort Worth & 
D. C. Ry. Co., supra. [Emphasis added.] 
5. It follows then, with no legally enforceable 
right extant in the appellant, that respondent violated no 
duty owed to appellant when it misquoted the rates. In fact, 
duties of common carriers concerning costs and services inci-
dent to transportation of interstate shipments are governed 
strictly by what is required in the I.C.A. and in the tariffs 
published and filed with the I.C.A. Davis v. Keystone Steel 
& Wire Co., supra. Simply stated, there is no duty on the 
part of respondent, or on the part of any interstate carrier, 
to provide a service of quoting rates, let alone of quoting 
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them 100% accurately. To so require would clearly frustrate 
the purposes of the I.e.A. which holds carriers and shippers 
equally responsible in the law to know and abide by the legal 
rates. This is the precise holding of the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota in W. C. Goodnow Coal Co. v. N. Pac. Ry., 162 N.W. 
519 (1917). In ruling that the defendant railroad had no 
legal duty to advise the plaintiff shipper of what transpor-
tation rates may or may not apply to the shipment in question, 
the court said at p.520: 
. . . [I]t cannot be conceded that 
plaintiff had the . . . right to 
require defendant, at its peril 
. . . to determine the question whether 
a through interstate rate would apply. 
The nature of the relations existing 
between plaintiff and defendant involved 
no such duty on defendant's part, and 
the statement of the local agent that 
a through rate would apply was but an 
expression of an opinion on his part 
upon a question of law, for which, 
even though erroneous, defendant is not 
liable in damages. In fact, both the 
character of the shipment from Minne-
apolis to Montevideo and tariff rate 
therefor were matters of law, not of 
fact, of which plaintiff, equally with 
defendant, was bound to take notice. 
Defendant, therefore, violated no 
duty it owed plaintiff in not ascer-
taining before forwarding the car the 
tariff rate thereon to Montevideo, and 
the trial court properly awarded judgment 
for defendant. [Emphasis added.] 
6. Finally, defendant is clearly barred by its own 
conduct from alleging a cause of action against respondent. 
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It is universally recognized that any conduct or any contract 
of an illegal nature cannot be the proper basis for a legal 
or equitable proceeding. The law simply will not permit one 
to take advantage of his own wrong or found any claim or 
acquire property by his own wrong, and no court will lend its 
aid to a party who grounds his action upon an illegal act 
or an illegal contract. There is no question that by agree-
ing to and, in fact, making payment for transportation of 
the shipments in question at a lower rate than what was 
authorized by published tariff, appellant (and respondent) 
entered into an illegal and unenforceable contract, So. Pac. 
v. Miller Abattoir Co., supra, which was clearly in violation 
of the I.C.A. Accordingly, defendant cannot be allowed to 
base a counterclaim upon such illegal act to which it was 
and still is part and parcel. Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Kirby, 
225 U.S. 155 (1912). 
CONCLUSION 
This case is not as confusing as appellant has 
attempted to make it. The relevant facts are clear and not 
in dispute. There is an overabundance of law, old and new, 
state and federal, including decisions of the U. S. Supreme 
Court, directly in point,. Appellant's argument is incorrect, 
illogical, and is not supported in the law. Respondent 
admits that transportation tariffs may be confusing and diffi-
cult to interpret at times for both shippers and carriers 
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alike. ^his cas^ is vvidenco of that fact. But respondent, 
like most if not all interstate carriers, does its best to 
accommodate requests for rate quotations. If, occasionally, 
a: *£;.. r ,- .; i t is generally found and a correction 
made a.- -oon as possible. The law requires no more of the 
Carrie • : -r i it woi ilt : -.\~: * -. relegislate the 
clear and universally accepted meaning of the Commerce Acts 
to restrict their application to intentional misconduct only, 
Clear 1} , uny complaints that appellant may have in this 
regard should be directed to Congress. 
Responded -?spectfully :--.^_^es\.^ i.:^- honorable 
Court to follow reason and established precedent and affirm 
Judge Croft's decision. 
DATED this 15th day of April ,A1976. 
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